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Using Accountable Self Regulation 
to Achieve Employment Equity 
in Universities 
By Ellen Baar 
L'auto-rkglementation responsable 
reprksente une solution de rechange au 
m&le & gestion descendante utilisk dam 
la plupart des programmes d'kquitk en 
mati&re d'emploi. L'auto-rkglementation 
comprend des r2glements pertinents et 
une connaissance opkrationnelle pour 
kliminer les obstackes systkmiques plutdt 
que d'engager un plus grand nornbre de 
femmes tout en maintenant les obstacles 
en place. Le prksent article met en relief 
les dificultks soulevkespar le recours au 
droit acquis plutdt qu'au com- 
munautarisme. 
Provincial and federal employment 
equity legislation has traditionally em- 
ployed a top-down approach to design 
and implementation of affmative action 
policies. As the Canadian Association of 
University Teachers has noted in its brief 
on the Federal Contractors Program, too 
little attention has been devoted to imple- 
mentation (CAUT 1992: 5). The literature 
which has emerged from the research of 
law and society scholars suggests an al- 
ternative to the topdown approach which 
may prove useful for those seeking rapid 
implementation of affirmative action 
within the universities-accountable self- 
regulation. This paper will draw upon the 
regulatory literature to define account- 
able selfregulation and why the approach 
might prove useful in university settings. 
Then, the paper will consider York Uni- 
versity's attempts to implement such an 
approach to increase the proportion of 
women faculty. The limited success of 
York's program will be explained by ad- 
dressing deviations from the accountable 
self regulation model which occurred 
during implementation at York and the 
failure of the Federal government to use 
the legal authority available to it under the 
Federal Contractors Program. 
Targetted Rules and Accountable 
Self Regulation 
Removing systemic barriers to equi- 
table hiring and promotion requires a 
transformation of assumptions and of hir- 
ing and promotional practices. In K. C. 
Davis' terms, transformation of hiring 
and promotional practices requires ad- 
equate confining, structuring and check- 
ing of discretion (Davis: 4-5). But if the 
rapid implementation of the rules em- 
ployed to limit discretion is to occur, 
those designing the rules must possess 
"street sense" (Stenning, Shearing and 
Addario: 18), or operational knowledge. 
They must possess first-hand knowledge 
of how hiring and promotional decisions 
are made in a given academic unit. In the 
absence of such knowledge, across- the- 
board rather than targetted rules will be 
employed (Baldwin: 331). While across- 
the-board rules provide for consistency 
across units and facilitate prosecution, 
they are not custom-designed to the cir- 
cumstances and, as a result, the probabil- 
ity that an implementation gap will de- 
velop--that the rules will not be applied 
effectively-increases substantially 
(Baldwin: 328-9; Clifford and Webb: 17). 
Targetted rules are more likely to be im- 
plemented because they are custom-de- 
signed, feasible and com-plementary. 
When rules are targetted to the cir- 
cumstances, the probability of compliance 
increases. However, targetted rules alone 
cannot ensure compliance. Compliance 
can only be achieved if those expected to 
come into compliance are highly moti- 
vated and if they possess the knowledge 
needed to define and refine their practices 
so that improvement becomes continuous. 
Creating adequate motivation to convince 
employers to change hiring and promo- 
tional practices is thus a prerequisite for 
change. 
Within academia, reputation is of criti- 
cal importance. Thus, the designers of the 
York University affmative action pro- 
gram for women faculty felt that the mo- 
tivation to improve hiring and promo- 
tional practices could be increased if 
reputation of a department were consist- 
ently affected by the degree of success 
achieved in hiring and promoting people 
from traditionally disadvantaged 
populations. Therefore, publication of 
units which were successful and unsuc- 
cessful in recruiting and retaining quali- 
fied women was expected to promote 
employment equity objectives. 
In addition, if a privilege such as gaining 
authorization to hire were granted and 
withdrawn inresponse tothedepartment's 
success in achieving employment equity 
objectives, then the motivation to imple- 
ment practices which identified qualified 
candidates from such groups successfully, 
encouraged them to apply and permitted 
their selection, should be significant. 
Development of a compliance system 
appropriate to the department's circum- 
stances should occur. 
But could departments design a com- 
pliance system appropriate to their needs? 
Clearly many of them would lack the 
expertise. As a result, departments would 
need an expert with whom to consult. 
Such a consultant could not design a sys- 
tem for them, since that individual would 
lack sufficient understanding of the cir- 
cumstances, but a consultant could give 
advice on options available and suggest 
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how others had dealt with similar prob- 
lems. If the advice given was to be used, 
reciprocity would need to be established 
between the department and the consult- 
ant (Bardach and Kagan: 130) since reci- 
procity is the foundation on which trust 
can be constructed. Given the need for 
reciprocity, the consultant could not as- 
sume responsibility for auditing compli- 
ance. That task would have to be vested 
elsewhere. 
The model adopted at York recog- 
nized that someone in each unit, an indi- 
vidual with operational knowledge and 
clout within the unit, would need to work 
on devising a plan of action appropriate to 
the unit's circumstances. These individu- 
als would have less knowledge about 
employment equity programs but would 
know how their unit defines positions, 
how recruitment is organized and candi- 
dates evaluated. By combining the two 
forms of expertise, it should be possible 
for each unit to develop a feasible plan of 
action. 
Joseph Rees' work on labour man- 
agement safety committees employed by 
California's Cooperative Compliance 
Program provided insights into where the 
auditing function should rest. Rees found 
that ongoing improvement of safety prac- 
tices required suggestions from employ- 
ees about how existing practices could be 
improved (Rees, 1988: Ch 5). However, 
he found that suggestions from workers 
would only be forthcoming if implemen- 
tation of their suggestions was rapid. Rapid 
implementation depended on allocations 
of resources from senior management. If 
the safety committee's representatives 
were highly respected employees chosen 
by their colleagues and the management 
representatives had clout with those sen- 
ior managers who could authorize neces- 
sary resources, continuous improvement 
would then become possible. 
By analogy if a joint labour manage- 
ment committee were responsible for 
auditing performance, the management, 
representatives had clout with manage- 
ment and the union representatives were 
respected by their colleagues, then the 
committee should be able to sell their 
recommendations consistently to man- 
agement and to labour. As well, when the 
committee was convinced that a depart- 
ment's compliance system was inad- 
equate, it should have sufficient clout to 
Figure 1 
Academic Units Which Haved Filled More Than Five Tenure Stream Positions 
1986-87 to 1989-90 
Unit WomenRotal Appointments % Women 
Admin. Studies 11/27 40.7 
Arts: 
Economics 017 0.0 
English 6/10 60.0 
Humanities 4P.33 54.6 
Language, Literature 
& Linguistics 511 1 45.5 
Mathematics 216 33.3 
Political Science 4110.67 37.5 
Psychology 711 3 53.8 
Social Science 618 75.0 
Sociology 516 83.3 
Atkinson: 
Admin. Studies 7/12 58.3 
Education 317 42.8 
Science: 
Biology 216 33.3 
Chemistry 017 0 .O 
Computer Science 019 0.0 
Physics 017 0.0 
ensure that privileges were withdrawn or 
a department's reputation affected. In other 
words, the role of the joint committee 
would be to audit behaviour and if moti- 
vation were deemed inadequate, the com- 
mittee would use reputation and its ability 
to recommend that privileges be removed 
to increase motivation in future. 
Braithwaite (p.1470) terms this ap- 
proach to regulation enforced self regula- 
tion while Baar (p.5) calls it accountable 
self regulation. Self regulation occurs 
when highly motivated actors develop a 
compliance or internal control system 
designed to ensure that members of an 
organization consistently behave as in- 
tended. Self regulation assumes that the 
actors are prepared to invest in obtaining 
the expertise needed to design an effec- 
tive compliance system and the resources 
required for speedy and effective imple- 
mentation. 
Accountable self regulation, on the 
other hand, does not assume that all actors 
are highly motivated or that they possess 
the required expertise. Instead, the need to 
increase motivation to comply is assumed 
and thus there is an ongoing need to 
monitor results, and take action to increase 
the degree of motivation. 
Let us contrast these assumptions with 
those which usually characterize employ- 
ment equity programs. The Federal Con- 
tractors Program (CAUT, 1991:3) assumes 
that the threat to withdraw federal grants 
from universities will motivate the presi- 
dent of a university to invest in purchas- 
ing the expertise needed to develop an 
affirmative action program which will 
establish and consistently achieve targets 
and timetables for hiring increased num- 
bers of people from traditionally disad- 
vantaged groups. In turn, those imple- 
menting the program are motivated to 
comply because the president and board 
of governors of their institution have au- 
thorized implementation of the targets 
and the timetable for their achievement. 
This approach concerns itself with results, 
paying little attention to how they are 
achieved. Attention does not focus on 
changing the hiring or promotional proc- 
esses. The structure remains the same but 
the results change in response to the au- 
thority of the president. At York 
Univeristy, this was called the top-down 
model and that model was rejected because 
it was seen as being incompatible with 
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collegial decision-making and decentrali- 
zation of hiring and promotional deci- 
sions. As Baldwin notes, "a 'top-down' 
approach is unrealistic, it fails to give due 
regard to enforcement difficulties and di- 
minishes the role of the enforcer" 
(Baldwin: 333). 
The York University Approach 
to Affirmative Action for 
Women Faculty 
Instead of employing a top-dowm 
model, contract negotiations at York 
University resulted in adoption of a form 
of accountable self regulation. The contract 
provided an affirmative action program 
for women faculty as a basis on which to 
build a broader employment equity pro- 
gram. The contract specified that units 
with fewer than 30% women faculty would 
be required to employ a 'substantially 
equal test' when evaluating potential new 
employees. All units were required to 
develop and gain approval of an affirma- 
tive action plan which would spell out 
their hiring processes. Affirmative action 
plans wouldbe approved by a joint labour 
management implementation committee. 
The committee would review all hirings 
to ensure that the plan had been followed 
and the committee was authorized to rec- 
ommend to the president that a hiring not 
be made if the hiring did not meet the 
committee's standard for affirmative ac- 
tion. As well, the contract provided for the 
half time release from teaching duties of 
an individual who would serve as an Af- 
firmative Action Director, a person with 
expertise to provide advice on how plans 
might be designed and implemented. 
Support services were provided as well. 
The 30% trigger defined those de- 
partments with fewer than 30% women 
faculty as out of compliance while those 
with 30% were defined as in compliance. 
Thus astandard hadbeen set and emphasis 
was placed on achieving the standard 
rather than on continuously improving 
the compliance system. As a result, the 
flexibility provided by accountable self 
regulation was not employed to its fullest. 
Even more important, it was assumed 
implicitly that systemic discriminationdid 
not exist in units which had 30% women, 
a most unfortunate feature of the design. 
Selection of the members of the Joint 
Implementation Committee on Affirma- 
tive Action was left to the discretion of the 
parties. Not enough attention was paid to 
ensuring that the management repre- 
sentatives had the clout needed with the 
President and the Vice President Aca- 
demic to ensure that committee recom- 
mendations were followed consistently. 
Faculty representatives on the committee 
tended to be volunteers. They also tended 
to be junior female members of their de- 
partments with an interest in equity issues, 
but often without the necessary clout 
among their colleagues. 
Deadlines for authorization of an af- 
firmative action plan were established, 
yet only units authorized to hire met these 
deadlines since there was too little moti- 
vation on the part of other units to develop 
a plan. Plans would not have been forth- 
coming if the Vice President Academic 
had not sent a memo to all units stating 
that units seeking approval to hire were 
required to have an approved affirmative 
action plan. In the absence of a willingness 
to withdraw the privilege of hiring, the 
motivation needed to develop and gain 
departmental and Joint Implementation 
Committee approval for a plan would 
have been lacking. People did not comply 
with the terms of the contract until the 
procedures for authorizing appointments 
- a matter not addressed in the contract - 
were amended to complement the pro- 
@=". 
Most units selected a woman within 
the unit or the unit's chair to develop a 
plan for their unit. There was little con- 
sultation within the units when the plan 
was under development. As a result of 
limited participation in plan development, 
hiring committees had a poor understand- 
ing of the processes they were expected to 
follow or the reasons for them. This re- 
duced the probability that better ways of 
achieving the plan's objectives would be 
developed enabling the plan to evolve 
continuously. 
Instead, units would approve the plan 
at a department meeting, and at the im- 
plementation stage it would be seen as a 
set of hoops a department had to go through 
to gain approval for a hiring recommen- 
dation made rather than as a new approach 
to hiring which would improve thequality 
of candidates and the ability of the unit to 
identify more effectively the most prom- 
ising candidates. 
One unit in which more than 30% of 
the faculty are women provided a model 
of how the process should work. By ap- 
proaching granting agencies distributing 
funds in the area in which they were 
searching, the unit was able to identify 
government researchers, people with ap- 
pointments in community colleges, as well 
as people in universities who had the 
skills required. Letters and telephone calls 
were employed to make these individuals 
aware of the job opening and to encourage 
applications. Several of those short-listed 
were not in the job market, were not 
searching for employment in universities, 
but applied in response to the encourage- 
ment to do so. 
Most applicants were fascinatedby the 
letter they received informing them of 
how the interview would be organized. 
Forty-five minutes was to be spent on a 
presentation of one's own research and 
answering questions. An additional forty- 
five minutes was to be devoted to defining 
how a second or third year course on the 
topic would be organized and taught. Dif- 
ferentiating between curriculum devel- 
opment and research skills during the 
interview process provided members of 
the hiring committee with information the 
committee believed was more accurate 
than that gathered through traditional in- 
terviewing processes. Those data in- 
creased the emphasis placed on curricu- 
lum development and teaching skills when 
evaluating candidates. 
Most units, however, made no signifi- 
cant changes in their interview processes. 
The areas in which change was most 
significant were identifying the pool of 
candidates and comparing candidates 
explicitly. To be approved, affirmative 
action plans were required to provide for 
proactive search, evidence that knowl- 
edgeable people with well-developed 
networks among the populations to be 
recruited had been contacted for sugges- 
tions of individuals who might be encour- 
aged to apply. As well, at the screening 
and interview stages units were expected 
to have instruments for receiving com- 
parative evaluations of candidates on job 
relevant criteria. Explicit comparison of 
candidates in the appointment file was a 
requirement which generated consider- 
able opposition from some units. The ab- 
sence of such comparisons became a fre- 
quent reason for returning appointment 
files for further information. 
Senior administrators were delighted 
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with the improved quality of appointment 
files as a result of the affirmative action 
for women initiative. Their audits of can- 
didate qualifications became easier to 
conduct. Yet, for the Implementation 
Committee, the auditing process remained 
difficult because its task was to review the 
process when women had not been found 
to be substantially equal to male appli- 
cants. 
Affirmative action representatives in 
the units rarely provided the implemen- 
tation committee with dataon the disputes 
which arose within units or on deviations 
from the plan which occurred. Such in- 
formation was more likely to be shared 
with the Affirmative Action Director but 
it was not revealed systematically to the 
implementation committee. As a result, 
the committee was forced to review cur- 
riculum vitae and letters of recommen- 
dations without theexpertisechmcteristic 
of a specialist in the field in search of 
evidence that qualified women had been 
afforded inadequate consideration. Re- 
quiring the director to make a recom- 
mendation on each appointment file and 
certification by the affirmative action rep  
resentative that the process giving rise to 
shortlisting and a recommendation to 
appoint was consistent with each stage in 
the unit's plan might improve the infor- 
mation available to the implementation 
committee. 
The process suffered from placing too 
much emphasis on developing a plan and 
getting it approved while placing too little 
emphasis on teaching unit representatives 
how to monitor compliance with the plan 
and how to report to the committee. An 
amendment to the contract providing that 
the affirmative action representative in 
units must be tenured failed to address the 
unwillingness of unit members to reveal 
to outsiders their unit's dirty laundry. 
Tenured representatives remained un- 
willing to "rat on their colleagues," an 
action that was seen to threaten the unit's 
access to valuablenew appointments. Yet 
unit representatives often lacked both the 
expertiseand theclout needed to convince 
unit members of the need to improve 
hiring processes. 
Furthermore, while the administration 
was prepared to allocate course release 
time for an affirmative action director 
when units needed assistance in develop- 
ing affirmative action plans that could 
gain the Implementation Committee's 
approval, the continuing need for expertise 
to train unit representatives and provide 
them with the design skills needed to 
continue improving theirplans was poorly 
understood. Thus, senior management 
deemed this a one-time-only rather than a 
continuing expenditure despite the fact 
that the funding was authorized in the 
contract. The perception that once in place 
plans do not need refinement is lethal to 
effective accountable self regulation, an 
approach which relies for its success on 
continuously improving the targetting of 
rules. As well, it is a view which disregards 
the need for continuously ensuring that 
motivation of units remains adequate to 
stimulate ongoing investment in improv- 
ing the processes. 
While the Affirmative Action for 
Women Faculty increased the proportion 
of women particularly in fields where the 
supply of qualified women is greatest, the 
program has proven ill-equipped to change 
the behaviour of units where supply is less 
plentiful and commitment to the objec- 
men talking with men about men's violence 
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solution. We are pursuing alternatives to this violence and we support the 
efforts of others and their response to it. 
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tives of the program is low relative to 
other priorities. Change in the behaviour 
of these units was expected to occur be- 
cause reputation would provide an incen- 
tive to comply. Yet the. ability to use 
reputation to increase motivation has been 
undermined by the belief on the part of 
some Implementation Committee mem- 
bers that the Committee's public report 
should not dwell on naming units out of 
compliance. Instead this information was 
communicated in private memoranda to 
the President and Academic Vice Presi- 
dent. Furthermore, a labour-management 
committee responsible for administering 
the collective agreement failed to author- 
ize publication of the Committee's Re- 
port. In another instance, threat of a 
grievance was required to gain release of 
the data from the report. Release of the 
text was never achieved and the data were 
not widely circulated. 
The York experience suggests that it is 
extremely difficult to get the Implementa- 
tion Committee and the President to assign 
affirmative action a higher priority than 
other critical academic priorities. As a 
result, the committee hesitated to recom- 
mend that an appointment not be made. 
Preparedness to make such a recommen- 
dation was more likely to come from the 
Implementation Committee. However, 
failure of the Academic Vice President 
and the President to accept such advice 
undermined the authority of the Imple- 
mentation Committee and the motivation 
of units to comply. In an effort to remain 
legitimate, the Committee became much 
less willing to recommend against an ap- 
pointment. Thus potential sanctions, such 
as the possibility of losing an appoint- 
ment, fell into disuse. 
During the first three years of opera- 
tion, substantially more women were hired 
in a wide variety of academic units than 
had been the case prior to implementation 
of the program. See Figure 1. Only a small 
number of academic units continued to 
have no women faculty or only a single 
woman faculty member. See Figure 2. 
However, there is little evidence that units 
treated their af f ia t ive  action plan as in 
need of continuous improvement. 
Amendments to improve plans were rare. 
Most units continued to do as little as was 
necessary to achieve access to valued 
privileges. As a result, the potential for 
development of compliance systems con- 
siderably more effective than the mini- 
mum required was not realized. In addi- 
tion, since contractual provisions applied 
to hiring but not promotion, insufficient 
attention was devoted to improving the 
process of determining whether candi- 
dates should move from pre-candidacy to 
candidacy for promotion and tenure. Pre- 
candidacy decisions tend to be made after 
two years and unlike promotion and ten- 
Figure 2 
Academic Units With Less Than 15% Women in Probationary 
Tenure Stream Positions 
1986-87 (%Women) 1989-90 (%Women) 
Arts: 
Economics 3.4 2.9 
Geography 0.0 8.7 
Philosophy 7.1 12.5 
Atkinson: 
Economics 11.1 11.1 
Fine Arts: Theatre 7.1 12.5 
Glendon: Economics 11.1 11.1 
Science: 
Computer Science 6.7 12.5* 
Earth & Atmospheric 0.0 11.1 
Physics 3.6 3.7 
ure decisions, there is little checking of 
these decisions by Faculty or Senate com- 
mittees. Given the degree of unchecked 
discretion, it is not surprising that concern 
about systemic discrimination at the pre- 
candidacy stage has developed. 
Communitarian Regulation and the 
Federal Contractors Program 
The literature indicates that account- 
able self regulation is most successful 
when there is what Rees has called 
communitarian regulation (Rees, 1991: 1 1). 
Three Mile Island stimulated 
communitarian regulation within the nu- 
clear industry because every member of 
the industry recognized that they shared a 
common fate: inadequate safety by any 
one member threatened the resources 
available to every other member. In re- 
sponse, members of the industry needed 
to collectively finance development and 
implementation of codes of practice. They 
established an audit system designed to 
identify those not complying with the 
codes so that nuclear generators could 
provide one another with advice on how 
to come into compliance as quickly as 
possible reducing the threat to all other 
members of the industry. (Shearing, 
Stenning, Addario: 12 ). The motivation 
to provide reliable risk reduction comes 
from the members of the industry rather 
than from outside the industry. Similarly, 
the Toronto Stock Exchange, concerned 
about its reputation, has developed an 
effective system for regulating its mem- 
bers and for checking the exchange of 
securities to ensure that operations of the 
market are fair (Stenning, Shearing, 
Addario and Condon: 106-107). 
The Federal Contractors Program has 
not generated communitarian regulation 
within the universities. Units have not 
become conscious of the spillover effects 
their behaviour can generate for one an- 
other threatening access of all units to 
federal funding. Unwillingnessof the fed- 
eral government to deny a university ac- 
cess to federal funding because employ- 
ment equity programs are inadequate de- 
ters development of communitarian 
regulation. Under such circumstances, 
compliance occurs because of the poten- 
tial loss of privilege rather than because 
each is a hostage to all others. If units 
Source: Report of the Joint Implementation Comminee on Affirmative Action for Women Faculty and 
Librarians 1989-90, North York: York University. inconsistency in report. believed that their own fate was deter- 
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mined by the actions of all other units 
within the university, then they would 
audit each other and advise one another on 
how their hiring practices could be im- 
proved. Auditing would not be employed 
to define those who need to be sanctioned; 
instead auditing would be employed to 
identify those whose practices need to be 
improved for the benefit of all. 
As long as the motivation to comply 
comes from the loss of privilege, rather 
than from being a hostage to all others, 
then the success of the program depends 
on the willingness of those dispensing 
privileges to withdraw them when com- 
pliance is insufficient. In the case of the 
York program that requires that units lose 
the ability to hire despite understaffing if 
their processes are inadequate or that the 
Implementation Committee and the 
President agree that an appointment should 
not be made because the search process 
did not meet affirmative action objec- 
tives. The parties must trade off adequate 
staffing of critical courses in the curricu- 
lum and support of collegial decision- 
making in order to support affirmative 
action objectives. 
The model for implementation of af- 
firmative action at York University as- 
sumed that the Federal Contractors Pro- 
gram would provide sufficient motivation 
for investment in an effective program. 
Furthermore, it assumed that reputation, 
an expert Affirmative Director and unit 
repre-sentatives with operational knowl- 
edge could provide the incentive and ex- 
pertise needed for continuous improve- 
ment in the quality of affirmative action 
plans. The unwillingness of the Federal 
Contractors Program to withdraw grants 
from universities not in compliance re- 
duced the potential for communitarian 
regulation. Improving the internal control 
system of units engaged in hiring became 
a less pressing priority reducing the pre- 
paredness of the university to invest in 
providing units with the expertise they 
needed to improve their hiring proce- 
dures. In fact with funding cuts and less 
emphasis on the size of the cohort nearing 
retirement, hiring assumedalower priority 
reducing the opportunities for the histori- 
cally disadvantaged to join the ranks of 
the professoriate. As the frequency of 
hiring declined so did preparedness to 
invest in an effective approach to af- 
firmative action. 
Conclusion 
Traditional approaches to affirmative 
action have relied on senior management 
to implement a private justice system 
which would provide the motivation 
needed to reduce systemic discrimination 
systematically. Private justice systems are 
not subject to legal standards; broad 
discretion accrues to those responsible for 
making hiring decisions. The breadth of 
discretion means that the results sought 
are often achieved by trading off fairness 
and consistency. 
By contrast,accountable selfregulation 
emphasizes the need for targetted feasible 
rules which confine, structure and check 
the exercise of discretion thereby limiting 
the ability to trade off affirmative action 
to achieve other objectives. The approach 
stresses the ability of behavioural order- 
ing (Stenning, Shearing, Addario and 
Condon: 108) to alter traditionally dis- 
criminatory practices as long as the mo- 
tivation to change remains substantial. 
Continuous auditing is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition. If compliance defi- 
cits are substantial (Rankin and Brown: 
332 ) then the motivation to change will 
be reduced. Yet the need for reciprocity 
(Bardach and Kagan: 130) promotes 
retreatism (Kagan: 93) reducing prepar- 
edness to employ available sanctions con- 
sistently. Under such circumstances, 
communitarian regulation is needed to 
promote ongoing investment by the em- 
ployer in reducing systemic discrimina- 
tion. However, the resulting investment 
in preventive measures, and in monitor- 
ing needed to implement remedial action 
rapidly, will only occur if the potential for 
calamity is perceived as being great and 
the spillover effects from each unit's ac- 
tions are deemed substantial. If the Fed- 
eral Contractors Program fails to with- 
draw funding, the potential to achieve 
change through accountable self regula- 
tion will decline substantially. 
The change required to eliminate 
systemic discrimination is neither simple 
nor cheap to implement. Thus, a high 
degree of motivation is needed if imple- 
mentation gaps and enforcement deficits 
are to be avoided (Genn:36). Generating 
wfficient motivation for employers to 
demand that units restructure themselves 
to reduce systemic discimination con- 
tinuously is critical. Until the federal 
government becomes prepared to use its 
procurement policy consistently to pro- 
vide the incentives required to generate 
such restructuring, the numbers of em- 
ployment equity group members em- 
ployed in faculty positions may increase 
but systemic discrimination will persist. 
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Correction 
In our Fall 1991 issue, "Violence 
Against Women: Strategies for Change," 
a rather serious typographical error oc- 
curred in Heidi Eigenkind's article, 
"Bearing Witness: A Questioning of the 
Politics of Memory." On page 24, where 
it reads: "Often, the knowledge that most 
challenges us comes in some form of 
memory: body sensations, stories fathers 
tell us," it should in fact read: "stories 
others tell us." Pointing out the error, 
Heidi writes to us that "no story ever told 
me by my father contained much truth!" 
Employment Equity in 
Ontario School Boards 
By AIison Taylor 
Depuis une quinzaine d'anntes, le 
minist2re de l'.??ducation & I' Ontario en- 
courage les conseils scolaires d mettre 
sur pied des programmes d'tquitt en 
mati2re d'emploi afin d'tliminer la dis- 
crimination bas te  sur le sexe d 
l'embauche. Le prtsent article donne un 
apercu de la politique d'tquitt en se 
fondant sur les exptriences de trois 
directrices d' tcoles  qui hiitent le 
changement duns le syst2me scolaire. 
In response to the demands of women's 
groups, for over fifteen years the Ontario 
Ministry of Education has been encour- 
aging school boards to develop employ- 
ment equity programs for women in order 
to eliminate gender-based discrimination 
in hiring. Currently, school boards are 
required to enact employment equity pro- 
grams for women and provincial targets 
have been set by Ministers of Education.' 
It is expected that women will represent 
fifty percent of the numbers in certain 
administrative positions by the year 2000. 
The most recent statistics available indi- 
cate that there is a long way to go for these 
targets to be met. 
There are four main components to 
employment equity programs within 
Ontario school boards. First, there is a 
requirement of datacollection. Since 1984, 
school boards have been required to col- 
lect data by sex on occupational and sal- 
ary distributions, and on projected va- 
cancies, qualified candidates, and com- 
petition processes. 
Second, school boards have been re- 
quired since 1984 to develop affirmative 
action plans with goals and timetables for 
the hiring, promotion, and training of all 
female employees. These programs re- 
main voluntary in that there are currently 
no sanctions for failing to meet targets. 
Third, since 1986, Directors of Educa- 
tion have been required to include af- 
firmative action sections in their annual 
reports. And finally, between 1985 and 
1989, school boards were encouraged to 
apply to the Ministry of Education for 
incentive funding to assist them in start- 
ing up their programs. This funding was 
to be used to support the employment of 
an employment equity coordinator within 
the board for 3 years (maximum $48,000 
in funds given per board). Boards were 
expected to make these positions perma- 
nent. 
Questions around the "success" of 
employment equity initiatives are fre- 
quently asked and clearly some form of 
policy evaluation is necessary. However, 
my purpose in this paper is to present and 
discuss some of the views and experi- 
ences of three women high school prin- 
cipals in Ontario school boards in order to 
explore how employmentequity programs 
actually work in practice and to identify 
locations forresistance andchange within 
hierarchical structures. 
Equity Policy in Practice 
My discussions with three high school 
principals who I will call Jan. Marg, and 
Dime, indicated certain problems with 
employment equity policy - problems 
inherent in the formation of the policy as 
well as in the implementation of programs 
within boards. In other words, the dis- 
course of employment equity is prob- 
lematic2 I found the women administra- 
tors tobe articulateinexpressing locations 
of contradiction and tension. 
For example, a critical issue concerns 
the justice of employment equity pro- 
grams. I am sure we have all heard it 
expressed that employment equity pro- 
grams simply perpetuate reverse dis- 
crimination. They interfere with the 
principle of merit, a sacred tenet of liberal 
democratic society. Conversely, defend- 
ants of employment equity programs tend 
to counter with the argment that equity 
for all requires treating groups different1 y , 
based on their different needs. 
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